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Our coastal waters are the United States’ most open and vulnerable borders. This vast 
maritime domain harbors critical threats from terrorism, criminal activities, and natural 
disasters. Maritime borders pose significant security challenges, as nefarious entities have 
used small boats to conduct illegal activities for years, and they continue to do so today. 
Illegal drugs, money, weapons, and migrants flow both directions across our maritime 
borders, as vessels can quickly complete these transits without detection. To what extent 
could Automatic Identification System (AIS) technology improve border security against 
the small vessel threat? 
This thesis provides an overview of existing AIS systems and reviews the 
maritime border security effectiveness and cost benefit impacts of potential AIS 
equipment carriage requirements. We compared and analyzed policy options and 
reviewed implementation issues and concerns. Our conclusions are that the Department 
of Homeland Security should implement a regulation for all vessels, regardless of size, to 
install and broadcast Class A or Class B AIS when conducting international voyages. The 
proposed regulation would expand the existing Small Vessel Reporting System to a 
mandatory program wherein mariners are required to preregister and file float plans prior 
to conducting an international voyage. This proposed action provides direct support to 
three of the five basic homeland security missions: prevent terrorism and enhance 
security, secure and manage our borders, and enforce and administer our immigration 
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Our coastal waters are the United States’ most open and vulnerable borders. This vast 
maritime domain harbors critical threats from terrorism, criminal activities, and natural 
disasters. The maritime border security mission is complex and challenging; the maritime 
domain is an expansive pathway to the world without fences that connects to more than 
95,000 miles of U.S. shoreline.1 This presents unique challenges and enforcing the law is 
difficult, especially when nefarious individuals intend to ignore it. Illegal drugs, money, 
weapons, and migrants flow both directions across our maritime borders as vessels can 
quickly complete these transits without detection. A recent Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report indicates, “Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of 
distinguishing between legitimate small vessel operators and the relatively few 
individuals estimated to be engaged in illicit activities.”2 This thesis looks at the extent 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) technology could improve border security and 
reduce the small vessel threat. 
An overview of Class A, Class B, and Class E AIS technology provides a baseline 
of current capabilities and use. The development of less expensive Class B AIS 
transceivers has increased the use of AIS beyond the Class A carriage requirements 
established by the International Maritime Organization. Recently deployed commercial 
satellite systems now provide almost worldwide coverage for tracking vessel AIS signals. 
Many countries have expanded AIS carriage requirements to improve maritime safety 
and security and small self-contained AIS identifiers now provide worldwide tracking of 
vessels of any size.  
1 Written Testimony of CBP Office of Air and Marine Assistant Commissioner Randolph Alles for a 
House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security Hearing Titled 
What Does a Secure Maritime Border Look Like? 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of Randolf Alles, U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol Office of Air and Marine Assistant Commissioner), accessed October 7, 2014 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/11/19/written-testimony-cbp-house-homeland-security-subcommittee-
border-and-maritime 
2 Stephen Caldwell, Maritime Security DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in Implementing 
the Small Vessel Security Strategy (GAO 14-32) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2013), 1. 
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In this thesis, three policy options for AIS equipment carriage requirements are 
developed and analyzed: status quo, Class A/B requirement policy option, and Class E 
requirement policy option. Maritime border security effectiveness and cost benefit 
impacts of each policy option is developed. Policy options are compared and analyzed 
and implementation issues and concerns are reviewed. As a cellular phone based system, 
Class E AIS was not considered an effective option for improving maritime security in 
the border region and excluded from further consideration. 
Conclusions are that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should implement 
a regulation for all vessels, regardless of size, to install and broadcast Class A or Class B 
AIS when conducting international voyages. The proposed regulation would expand the 
existing Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS) to a mandatory program in which 
mariners are required to pre-register and file float plans prior to conducting an 
international voyage. Analysis indicates implementation costs for both the government 
and public are low and the program has the potential to make maritime border security 
operations more efficient and effective. If the government attempted to detect, identify, 
interdict, and board each vessel crossing our maritime border as is done now with aircraft 
and vessels, it would expend between $5,000 and $10,000 per maritime boarding event. 
AIS allows law enforcement agencies to monitor the border without having to detect, 
identify, and interdict on the water. Agencies can decide the need, time, and location of 
conducting a boarding to ensure compliance with federal law providing a more 
streamlined border crossing for the mariner. A comparison to private aviation 
requirements for border crossings supports the implementation of an AIS requirement.  
To facilitate the drafting of appropriate AIS rules and regulations as well as an 
effective implementation strategy, DHS should engage the various stakeholders via a 
second National Small Vessel Security Summit. This summit should review the changes 
in technology and threat and advise DHS on a specific AIS policy design that balances 
competing issues and concerns yet fulfills maritime security needs. As an incentive to 
participate with the program the federal government should consider offering a financial 
rebate to those that purchase an AIS and register with the Small Vessel Reporting 
System. This proposed action provides direct support to three of the five basic homeland 
 xvi 
security missions: prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our 
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Our country’s ports and waterways are physically, economically, and culturally 
significant to our way of life. We use our maritime venues for recreation and 
transportation of people and products to our economic benefit and expect this to be a safe 
and secure environment. Our coastal waters are also the United States’ most open and 
vulnerable borders. This vast maritime domain generates critical threats from terrorism, 
criminal activities, and natural disasters.1 The United States (U.S.) maritime borders pose 
significant security challenges (e.g., nefarious entities have used small boats to conduct 
illegal activities for years and they continue today). Illegal drugs, money, weapons, and 
migrants flow both directions across our maritime borders as vessels can quickly 
complete these transits without detection. To what extent could Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) technology improve border security against the small vessel threat?  
A. SMALL VESSEL THREAT  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published the Small Vessel Security 
Strategy (SVSS) in 2008 to harmonize related strategies into a multi-layered, unified 
approach to improve security across all levels of government that work within the 
maritime domain.2 Three years later, DHS published the Small Vessel Security Strategy 
Implementation Plan to provide a roadmap for realizing the goals and objectives of the 
DHS National Small Vessel Security Strategy.3 DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy 
Implementation Plan Goal 2 is “to enhance maritime security and safety based on a 
coherent plan with a layered, state-of-the-art approach.”4 Goal 3 of this strategy is to 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan Report to the 
Public (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 1.  
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 16. 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan, 1.  
4 Ibid., 6. 
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“leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect, determine intent, and, when 
necessary interdict suspicious small vessels.”5  
1. SVSS  
DHS crafted the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) to “reduce potential 
security and safety risks from small vessels
 
through the adoption and implementation of a 
coherent system of regimes, awareness, and security operations that strike the proper 
balance between fundamental freedoms, adequate security, and continued economic 
stability.”6 The four scenarios that cause the greatest concern for the use of small vessels 
in terrorist-related attacks are identified in the SVSS as: 
a) Domestic use of waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs);  
b) Conveyance for smuggling weapons (including WMDs) into the United 
States;  
c) Conveyance for smuggling terrorists into the United States; and  
d) Waterborne platform for conducting a stand-off attack (e.g., Man-Portable 
Air-Defense System (MANPADS) attacks).7  
Two of these four high consequence scenarios involve vessels smuggling people and/or 
weapons into the U. S. across the maritime border.  
2. DHS Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan  
To move closer to the goal of small vessel security, the DHS Small Vessel 
Security Implementation Plan was forged in 2011 to improve overall management of 
maritime risks. The plan “builds upon a strong, successful partnership and dialogue 
among federal and local authorities, small vessel stakeholders, the private sector, and the 
general public.”8 The plan identifies potential and existing methods for managing and 
controlling maritime risks associated with the use of small vessels for terrorism. The 
Implementation Plan has four stated goals:  
 
5 Ibid., 8. 
6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, 1.  
7 Ibid., 11. 
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan, 1. 
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1 Develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel 
community and public and private sectors in order to enhance maritime 
domain awareness;  
2 Strengthen maritime security and safety based on a coherent plan with a 
layered, innovative approach;  
3 Exploit technology to enhance our ability to detect, determine the intent 
of, and, where necessary, interdict small vessels; and,  
4 Enhance coordination, cooperation, and communications between Federal, 
state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies, the private sector, and non-
governmental organizations as well as international partners.9  
The Implementation Plan is not a resourcing document and all government 
activities are required to follow the standard federal appropriations process and 
regulatory review procedures for funding support and execution. The plan “lays out 
ongoing and contemplated activities to meet the objectives of the Strategy and promotes 
active linkages of DHS components, state, tribal, local, and other national authorities.”10 
Although the U.S. has a strong vision for small vessel security, there is very weak budget 
support to implement the various plans and intended actions. Funding requests have been 
made by DHS, but there have been no funds authorized to specifically support small 
vessel security issues in recent DHS budgets.11  
The vastness of the maritime domain provides great opportunities for exploitation 
by terrorists. The use of smaller commercial and recreational vessels closer to shore and 
areas of interest to transport WMD is of significant concern. Terrorists have 
demonstrated that they have the capability to use explosive-laden suicide boats as 
weapons as demonstrated by the attack on the USS Cole. The Mumbai attacks in India 
were carried out using a hijacked fishing vessel. In a world where small watercraft can be 
turned into weapons against navy destroyers and pirates can hold ships for ransom, 
surveillance of the sea is of increasing importance.12 
9 Ibid., 2. 
10 Ibid., 12. 
11 William Painter, and Jennifer Lake, Homeland Security Department: FY2012 Appropriations, 
(R41982), (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011). 
12 “Maritime Security—Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA),” NATO Science and Technology 
Organization, accessed July 11, 2014, http://www.cmre.nato.int/research/maritime-situational-awareness 
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In addition to potential terrorist use of small vessels, our nation must strengthen 
the means to detect and deter illegal or harmful activity designed to take advantage of 
inherent vulnerabilities within the maritime domain. To protect, prevent, mitigate, and 
enhance recovery from all threats, including human and drug smuggling, the United 
States must achieve a more comprehensive and effective understanding of the maritime 
domain. Table 1 of the National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan, published in 
December 2013, lists the top challenge to U.S. maritime domain awareness as the 
collection of non-emitting and uncooperative vessels.13 These small dark non-emitting 
and uncooperative vessels intentionally conduct undetected maritime operations while 
they transport people, weapons, money, and drugs in support of criminal or terrorist 
activities. Requiring all vessels that conduct international voyages to or from the United 
States to carry and broadcast AIS would improve the visibility of legitimate small vessel 
traffic.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW OF SMALL VESSEL DETECTION 
Key to improving small vessel security is increasing the ability to detect small 
vessels and determine intent of these small dark contacts. In his 2007 Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) thesis, John Crofts proposes to use radio frequency identification (RFID) 
tags to monitor small vessels. Crofts finds, “an RFID-based monitoring system could 
work effectively as one layer in a multi-faceted small vessel monitoring program.”14 
Although this technology could support small vessel security in accordance with Goal 3 
of the Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan, mentioned above, there has been no 
action toward the use of RFID to track and monitor small boats. The limited range of 
detection and privacy concerns are the most likely drawbacks to employing RFID in the 
maritime arena. As Crofts concludes that RFIDs would only be one layer of a complete 
system; an effective small vessel monitoring system must alert to vessels that are not 
carrying RFID tags.  
13 National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, 2013, 
White House, accessed July 17, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs 
/national_maritime_domain_awareness_plan.pdf, C-1. 
14 John A. Crofts, “Radio Frequency Identification Potential to Monitor Small Vessels” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 52. 
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In his 2010 NPS thesis, Jeffrey Westling proposes a Great Lakes Maritime 
Operations Center with the installation of radar surveillance equipment coupled with 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) transceivers to monitor and track vessel 
movements in the Great Lakes region.15 This system would improve maritime domain 
awareness (MDA) and security by automatically notifying Command Center 
watchstanders when a vessel violates border crossing regulations or security zones.16 In 
his thesis, Westling calls for increasing infrastructure and coordination to improve the 
common operating picture, but he does not expand the AIS carriage requirements. 
Legislation or the establishment of new rules would be necessary to require all vessels to 
purchase AIS equipment and transmit identification signals. Thus, far there has been no 
action to put in place such a requirement. Furthermore, a recent 2011 Congressional 
research report states, “It appears the Coast Guard has no immediate plans to require 
smaller vessels be outfitted with transponders.”17 
In 2010, Dr. Stephen Harris at the Savannah River National Laboratory led a team 
that looked into computer-based simulation modeling to determine “the probability of 
encountering an adversary based on allocated resources including response boats, patrol 
boats and helicopters over various environmental conditions including day, night, rough 
seas and various traffic flow rates.”18 The U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) has used 
probability and detection theory for years to optimize search and rescue, law enforcement 
and security operations.19 Harris’s paper produced no new concepts or unique resource 
allocations to improve the probability of detection of a small vessel. In addition, the 
Coast Guard does not have sufficient helicopters and small boats to use as primary 
15 Jeffrey C. Westling, “Securing the Northern Maritime Border through Maritime Domain 
Awareness” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 72. 
16 Ibid. 
17 William Painter, Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 112th Congress (R42025), 
(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 31. 
18 Dave Dixon et al., Security Modeling for Maritime Port Defense Resource Allocation (Aiken, SC: 
Savannah River National Laboratory, 2010), 3.  
19 U. S. Coast Guard, The U.S. Coast Guard Addendum to the United States National Search and 
Rescue Supplement (NSS) to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual 
(IAMSART) (Commandant Instruction M16130.2F), (Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2013), accessed October 7, 2014 http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/manuals/
COMDTINST%20M16130.2F.pdf, H-81. 
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detection assets due to the immense size of the maritime domain and high operating 
expenses. In concert with Goal 3 of the Implementation Plan, agencies should seek 
technology to enhance the ability to detect, to determine the intention of, and to interdict 
small vessels.20  
In his NPS thesis from 2009, Brian Hill proposes a nationwide effort to identify 
areas where a small boat attack could be staged or originated, and then provide a focused 
and coordinated presence in these areas. The Coast Guard has adopted Hill’s Operation 
Focused Lens as a best practice since the program’s goal is to detect an attack before it 
begins.21 The effort has Coast Guard personnel visiting high-risk marinas on a frequent 
basis and training local mariners on America’s Waterway Watch program.22 During the 
2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver British Columbia, the Coast Guard utilized over 
400 local Coast Guard Auxiliary and watch group members in and around the Puget 
Sound region to increase vigilance and communication using the Focused Lens approach. 
Focused Lens was identified by DHS in 2013 during a Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) audit on progress in implementing the SVSS as a key initiative that enhances 
small vessel security.23 This effort improves internal security but does not reduce the 
threat from external small vessels that begin voyages outside of the United States.  
To counter the threat posed by small vessels exploiting the porous maritime 
border with Canada, the Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations 
agreement (ICMLEO-Shiprider) framework was signed in 2009 by former Public Safety 
Minister Peter Van Loan and Janet Napolitano, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security.24 
This program uses law enforcement personnel from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) and USCG to conduct joint patrols on small boats in the border region. This 
20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan, 8. 
21 Brian P. Hill, “Maritime Terrorism and the Small Boat Attack Threat to the United States: A 
Proposed Response” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 12. 
22 Ibid., 69. 
23 Stephen Caldwell, Maritime Security DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in Implementing 
the Small Vessel Security Strategy (GAO 14-32), (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2013), 22. 
24 “Canada-U.S. Shiprider,” Royal Canadian Mounted Police, last modified June 17, 2013, 
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/shiprider-eng.htm  
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effort effectively removes the international maritime border as a weakness to be exploited 
by criminals as the patrol vessel crewed with both USCG and RCMP can enforce laws on 
both sides of the border.25 This program aligns with the Implementation Plan 
requirement of building innovative partnerships and improving cooperation, but it brings 
no additional resources to the Coast Guard. Existing crews and small boat hours have 
been redirected to support this worthwhile effort.  
C. STATUS QUO 
Operators of small pleasure craft on international voyages arriving in the United 
States are required to report their entrance immediately to U. S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) as per Reports of Arrival of Vessels in the 19 CFR 4.2.26 In addition, 
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection establishes specific reporting locations for 
recreational boaters to moor and be inspected. There are several programs in place to 
facilitate these requirements and streamline the processing of recreational boaters return 
to the U.S. In July 2011, “CBP developed the Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS) to 
better track small boats arriving from foreign locations and deployed this system to eight 
field locations.”27 Unfortunately this option, as well as all arrival reporting programs, is 
based on a self-reporting system where mariners phone in their arrivals to CBP to comply 
with Report of Arrival of Vessels, Vehicles, and Aircraft, 19 USC 1433.28 Law abiding 
citizens are likely to comply with these requirements, but criminals and terrorists would 
simply forgo checking in with CBP and enter the country illegally. Amitai Etzioni 
highlights this gap in security and the likelihood that many small vessels arriving into the 
United States go unchecked by failing to comply with the reporting process.29 His article 
highlights the lax enforcement of entry by mariners as compared to the tight security 
25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Northern Border Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2012), 5. 
26 Reports of Arrival of Vessels, 19 C.F.R. 4.2, 1993. 
27 Caldwell, Maritime Security DHS Could Benefit, 11. 
28 U. S. Customs and Border Protection, “Pleasure Boat Reporting Requirements,” U. S. Customs and 
Border Protection, accessed July 22, 2014, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/pleasure_boats/boats/
pleasure_boat_overview.xml  
29 Amitai Etzioni, “The Joke is on Air Travelers,” Huffington Post, April 7, 2011. 
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imposed on air travelers. The current system also allows an unlawful mariner to make 
landfall, moor, offload contraband or personnel, and then contact CBP for inspection 
after completing illegal activity. A system to detect, determine intent, and interdict small 
vessels crossing our maritime borders as proscribed by Goal 3 is needed.  
President Reagan’s famous Russian saying regarding nuclear arms-control was 
doveryai, no proveryai, “trust, but verify.” We could use some of his wisdom along our 
maritime borders today. We are trusting that all mariners aboard small boats entering the 
country are law-abiding citizens; however, the nation would benefit from a system to 
verify the movements of these small vessels.  
D. POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
As Westling postulates in his thesis, AIS is a critical element to maritime domain 
awareness and improving the security of our borders.30 AIS alone is not the solution and 
sensors to detect vessels not transmitting AIS are needed. This thesis will analyze to what 
extent maritime border security could be improved through the use of AIS policy changes 
coupled with recent improvements in technology.  
Government agencies would be significantly more effective and efficient in 
securing our maritime borders if all vessels crossing the maritime border were 
broadcasting AIS. In concert with Goal 3, requiring all vessels, regardless of size, that 
conduct international voyages to install and broadcast AIS would leverage existing 
technology to monitor, detect, and determine intent of small vessels in the maritime 
arena. This requirement, the mandatory broadcast of AIS, would increase the security of 
our nation and the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts by directing limited resources 
to intercept and board small vessels transiting our maritime borders that are not 
broadcasting AIS.  
Following this introduction, an overview of existing AIS systems is provided in 
Chapter II, and in Chapter III the maritime border security effectiveness and cost benefit 
impacts of potential AIS requirements are discussed. In Chapter IV, the policy options 
30 Westling, “Securing the Northern Maritime Border,” 71. 
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are compared and analyzed and implementation issues and concerns are considered. 
Within Chapter IV, the current and future aviation border security laws and procedures to 
support potential changes in maritime border security requirements are also reviewed. 















II. AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM 
A. AIS OVERVIEW 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an automatic tracking system used on 
ships and by vessel traffic services (VTS) for identifying and tracking vessels by 
electronically exchanging data with other nearby ships and AIS base stations. A ship 
borne AIS combines a very high frequency (VHF) transceiver with a positioning system, 
most often a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, with other electronic navigation 
sensors, such as a gyrocompass or rate of turn indicator. An AIS-equipped system on 
board a ship displays information on other vessels in the vicinity via a variety of 
information display systems: standalone AIS transceivers, radar, or integrated charting 
systems. AIS information supplements marine radar, which continues to be the primary 
method of collision avoidance in the maritime arena.31  
There are several versions of AIS equipment: Class A, Class B, Class B receive 
only, and identifiers that are fully self-contained battery powered AIS units with internal 
GPS and antenna. AIS was originally configured to transmit data via VHF radio 
frequencies and therefore limited to line-of-sight distances based on the height of VHF 
radio antennas on a ship’s mast. Information provided by AIS equipment includes vessel 
identification, position, course, speed as well as other parameters like destination, 
estimated time of arrival, and rate of turn.32 Vessels fitted with AIS transceivers and 
transponders can be tracked by AIS base stations located along the coast. Numerous 
websites provide real-time data on maritime traffic in the area by collecting and 
displaying the AIS information received. Commercial AIS systems using VHF-FM radio 
coverage can provide data well offshore depending on the height of the vessel’s mast, 
locations of shore-based antennas, and transmit power33 as shown in Figure 1 taken from 
31 U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center, “Automatic Identification System Overview,” accessed July 
11, 2014, http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISmain  
32 Evans Starzinger, “Collision Avoidance 2.0,” Boat US Magazine, October/November, 2013, 
accessed August 10, 2014, http://www.boatus.com/magazine/2013/October/collision-avoidance.asp 
33 Ibid. 
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MarineTraffic.com. AIS signals are displayed in Figure 1 by vessel type (color), size, and 
direction of travel; squares represent vessels drifting or moored. Hovering the mouse over 
contacts will bring up the vessel name, course, and speed. Clicking on the contact will 
bring up complete AIS data including track history, pictures, and destination. As 
demonstrated by Figure 1, in a VHF-FM “line-of-sight” based system, shore based towers 
generally receive and display AIS information when the vessels are within 80 nautical 
miles of the mainland. 
 
Figure 1.  VHF-Based AIS Coverage 
Recently, satellites have been fitted with special AIS receivers that are capable of 
managing a large number of signals.34 The AIS identifier shown in Figure 2 is the 
advanced Class B satellite enabled AIS (ABSEA) along with typical satellite AIS 
coverage. Details on the product and recent technology advances that allow worldwide 
34 London Research and Development Corporation, “Automatic Identification of Ships (AIS),” 
accessed July 11, 2014, http://www.london-research-and-development.com/AIS.html  
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AIS coverage can be found at the exactEarth website. Deployment of satellite 
communications-enabled and linked AIS receivers have enabled vast improvements in 
maritime coverage providing essentially worldwide vessel tracking capabilities and 
services as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  AIS Identifier and Satellite-Based AIS Coverage35 
B. CLASS A AIS 
Class A AIS equipment standards were established to comply with safety of life at 
sea (SOLAS) requirements, including integration of bridge equipment and displays; 
transmit power of 12.5 watts, and use of self-organizing time division multiple access 
(SOTDMA) VHF-FM transmissions. When a Class A AIS starts up, SOTDMA “pre-
determines its data transmission slots by ‘listening’ to the existing traffic. This establishes 
which slots are free, helped by stations already ‘on-air,’ which broadcast their future slot 
selection as part of their transmitted messages.”36 SOTDMA helps to manage and 
35 exactEarth, “ABSEA,” accessed February 17, 2014, http://www.exactearth.com/technology/absea  
36 Andy Norris, “Automatic Identification Systems: The Effects of Class B on the Use of Class A 
Systems,” The Journal of Navigation 59, no. 2 (2006): 335–347. 
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maximize the flow of data over the VHF-FM band by eliminating units from 
broadcasting simultaneously. In a congested area with limited time slots, the AIS unit 
will select a timeslot being used by the most distant transmitter. This feature gives 
preference to the closer targets that are of greater concern and drops out the targets 
farther away. Class A units refresh their position and movement information every two to 
10 seconds while underway, depending on vessel speed and every three minutes while 
anchored or moored. Static data including vessel name, type, call sign, International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) number, destination, and estimated time of arrival is 
reported every six minutes.37   
C. CLASS B AIS  
The key differences between Class A and B AIS are lower transmitting power, 
slower refresh rates, and data transmission method. Class B units use 2 or 5 watts as their 
maximum transmit power and refresh rates between five and 30 seconds depending on 
vessel speed and transmission method. Some Class B units use SOTDMA, identical to 
Class A, while others use carrier sense time division multiple access (CSTDMA) 
transmissions that are designed not to compete with Class A broadcasts. Class B units 
operating CSTDMA monitor the time slots to sense the presence of a Class A 
transmission. The unit waits about two microseconds and when it senses an unused time 
slot it will broadcast its data. The combination of lower power and CSTDMA protocols 
“ensure that Class B stations do not significantly affect the channel capacity of Class A 
traffic.”38 
D. SATELLITE AIS  
Since 2008, commercial companies have been launching low-earth orbiting 
satellites with AIS receivers and offering worldwide vessel tracking services using data 
received from AIS transponders aboard vessels. These satellites currently use two 
methods for collecting and retransmitting AIS data. In low-density locations, they use an 
37 U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center, “Automatic Identification System Types of AIS,” accessed 
July 11, 2014, http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=typesAIS 
38 Ibid. 
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onboard processor and relay AIS data like an Earth-based VHF tower. In areas of higher 
vessel density, the chance of time slot collisions increase generating a higher probability 
of data loss. In these areas, satellites use spectrum de-collision processing where all of the 
AIS signals are collected and then re-transmitted back to Earth where computers are used 
to process the data and de-collide any messages that were received simultaneously from 
vessels.39 Commercial satellite companies have established worldwide networks resulting 
in satellite-based collection of AIS as the primary means of tracking vessels at sea.40  
E. CLASS E AIS 
Technology Systems, Inc. has developed a new free smartphone application (app) 
called Smart Chart AIS. Smart Chart AIS’s development has been supported by the DHS 
Science and Technology Directorate under the Small Business Innovation Research 
Program, Contract #D12PC00364. The app provides visibility of AIS Class A and B 
traffic and “introduces a new cellular-based AIS capability, called AIS Class E, which is 
tailored for smaller, recreational craft.”41 The app includes many additional features that 
improve mariner safety, including an augmented reality feature allowing boaters to “see” 
in fog, darkness, and other low-visibility situations, the locations of buoys and channel 
markers are displayed, and live weather overlays are available. Users can transmit their 
location immediately in the event of an emergency and use the social networking to chat 
boat-to-boat with friends, send photos, share waypoints, arrange where to rendezvous, 
and find friends in a large or crowded harbor.42 As boaters elect to use this technology to 
improve their safety and social networking, they “get lots of valuable resources free of 
charge, in exchange for participating in this new form of AIS.”43 The app is available on 
phones with either android or apple operating systems. As of October 2014, the android-
39 Heather Ball, Satellite AIS for Dummies, Special edition (Mississauga, Ontario: John Wiley and 
Sons, 2013), 21. 
40 Edward Lundquist, “Connecting the Dots,” Proceedings, 140, no. 10 (2014): 22.  
41 “Need Maritime Security? There’s an App for That,” Maritime Security Outlook, accessed 
December 28, 2013, http://www.maritimesecurityoutlook.com/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=110:aisapp&catid=2:products&Itemid=5  
42 “Smart Chart AIS,” accessed December 27, 2013, http://www.smartchartais.com./ ( 
43 “Need Maritime Security? There’s an App for That.”  
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based Smart Chart app reported 10,000 to 50,000 users providing more than 300 reviews 
with an average rating of 3.6 out of 5.44 A primary difference between Class E and Class 
A/B is that Class E AIS operates over the cellular phone network and not VHF-FM or 
satellite. As a smart phone app, the device is mobile and not mounted to a specific vessel 
but it can be associated with a vessel for identification purposes.  
F. AIS REGULATIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
The International Maritime Organization Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) AIS 
carriage requirements can be found in Regulation 19, Chapter V. As of 2005 the 
requirements are, “all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international 
voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international 
voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size”45 shall be fitted with AIS.   
Current AIS carriage requirements for U.S. vessels are contained in 33 CFR 
164.64 and are summarized as applying to:  
• Self-propelled vessels of 65 feet or more in length, other than passenger 
and fishing vessels, in commercial service and on an international voyage; 
• Passenger vessels of 150 gross tonnage or more or certificated to carry 
more than 150 passengers-for-hire; 
• Tankers, regardless of tonnage; 
• Vessels, other than passenger vessels or tankers, of 300 gross tonnage or 
more; 
• Towing vessels of 26 feet or more in length and more than 600 
horsepower in commercial service within a Vessel Traffic System.46  
The Coast Guard has proposed new AIS regulations to expand the required 
carriage to additional vessels. The proposed regulations have been published in the 
Federal Register, are pending implementation, and are summarized as:  
• All commercial self-propelled vessels 65 ft in length or greater—no 
exclusions.  
44 “Smart Chart AIS Android,” accessed December 27, 2013, https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.tsinc.smartchart&hl=en  
45 “IMO Automatic Identification Systems,” accessed February 2, 2014, http://www.imo.org/
OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/AIS.aspx 
46 Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. 164.64. 
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• Towing vessels of 26 feet or more in length and more than 600 
horsepower, in commercial service (expands current requirement to all 
locations).  
• Vessels with 50 or more passengers for hire;  
• High-speed passenger vessels with 12 or more passengers for hire;  
• Certain dredges and floating plants;  
• Vessels moving certain dangerous cargos47 
These new proposed regulations do not alter the international SOLAS 
requirements for carriage of Class A AIS, although Class B devices will be authorized to 
meet the new requirements on some commercial vessels. As Class A devices transmit 
data more frequently, they are a better option for “commercial vessels that are highly 
maneuverable, travel at high speed, or routinely transit congested waters or in close-
quarter situations with other AIS equipped vessels.”48 The current and proposed U.S. 
regulations do not require small private vessels to install and transmit AIS although some 
U.S. mariners could be required to install and transmit AIS when conducting international 
voyages to other countries. A review of international use of AIS supports the safety and 
security benefits of this technology.  
G. INTERNATIONAL USE OF AIS 
The primary requirement for the use of AIS in the international community is 
contained in the international convention for SOLAS. AIS carriage requirements from 
Regulation 19 of SOLAS, Chapter 5, are summarized as: “all ships of 300 gross tonnage 
and upwards engaged on international voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and 
upwards not engaged on international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of 
size.”49 This IMO requirement went into effect in December of 2004.  
The versatility of new and modern variants of AIS has resulted in additional 
regulations by various countries to improve maritime domain awareness, safety, and 
47 U. S. Coast Guard, “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Vessel Requirements for Notices of Arrival 
and Departure, and Automatic Identification System,” Federal Register 73, no. 242 (2008): 76317–76318. 
48 U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center, “Automatic Identification System Overview.” 
49 International Maritime Organization, “IMO SOLAS Regulations for AIS Carriage,” accessed July 
16, 2014, http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/AIS.aspx 
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security. As of January 2012, Singapore has extended the requirement that all power 
driven vessels entering Singapore waters have on board and operating a class A or class 
B AIS transponder.50 Previously, the AIS requirement did not apply to private visiting 
vessels.51  
The Mexican government has also taken steps to improve identification 
requirements of vessels in its waters. Mexico has received $4.9M in funding from the 
U.S. Department of State for the purchase of Class B AIS I-100 identifiers to be installed 
on all vessels greater than seven meters in length operating in its waters.52 The I-100 
identifiers are transmitting only devices that allow the government of Mexico to “locate 
and identify (in real time) any small vessels cruising Mexican National waters.”53 As of 
June 2014, the Mexican government has installed over 7,000 of the planned 19,000 AIS 
identifiers on commercial, tourist, and fishing vessels.54 In addition to Mexican flagged 
vessels, the regulation technically encompasses all vessels greater than seven meters in 
length visiting Mexico. How soon Mexico begins to enforce this new AIS regulation on 
visiting U.S. vessels is unknown.  
In 2009, after the Mumbai attacks, India announced a new requirement for the 
installation and use of AIS equipment on all vessels other than fishing vessels that are 
less than 20 meters in length. This requirement is intended to improve safety and security 
and during the regulation “roll-out” India explained, “That the uniform registration 
practice and installation of AIS transponders would go a long way in tracking lost or 
hijacked vessels like MV Kuber, which was hijacked by the terrorists involved in the 
50 Victor Han, Carriage of Transponders—Port Entry Requirement (Port Marine Circular #10 of 
2010), Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, accessed July 17, 2014, http://www.mpa.gov.sg/sites/
circulars_and_notices/pdfs/port_marine_circulars/pc10-10.pdf 
51 Val Ellis, “New—AIS Requirement for Yachts Entering Singapore,” Noonsite, accessed January 16, 
2014, http://www.noonsite.com/Members/val/R2012-04-02-1  
52 Bruce Striegler, “Vancouver’s Xanatos Marine Makes AIS Sale to Mexican Merchant Marine,” 
Canadian Sailings, September 16, 2012, accessed July5, 2014, http://www.canadiansailings.ca/?p=4699 
53 Monica Niiranen, 2014 AIS Installation Progress (Washington, DC: Department of State/
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, 2014).  
54 Ibid. 
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Mumbai attacks.”55 An Indian committee is currently studying equipment and 
requirements that could provide MDA over vessels less than 20 meters but no regulations 
have been enacted. To support this effort, India contracted Saab, in collaboration with 
Elcome Marine Services, to install a National Automatic Identification System (NAIS) 
network. The 74 lighthouses outfitted with the Saab system provides AIS coverage to the 
entire Indian Coast and is monitored at six regional control and two coastal control 
centers, besides one national data center. In July 2013, India, Maldives, and Sri Lanka 
agreed to share AIS information via the Merchant Ship Information System (MSIS) to 
bring about maritime domain awareness in the region. India has also recently added 200 
patrol vessels between five and 12 tons to perform intercepts of suspected dark contacts. 
A study recommended setting up of an additional 131 coastal police stations along the 
Indian coastline and upgrading 20 existing police stations in the Andaman and Nicobar 
islands.56  
In 2009, the European Union (EU) updated the AIS carriage requirement to 
include more fishing vessels operating within EU waters. The phased implementation 
ending 31 May 2014 is now complete with all fishing vessels of 15 meters in length or 
more required to carry AIS equipment.57 The United Kingdom completed an analysis of 
the regulation to include cost impacts and elected to follow the EU requirement.58  
Other countries have also taken steps toward mandatory identification systems. 
For example, Turkey is mandating 25,000 commercial vessels to carry Class B AIS and 
many other nations are enacting sweeping AIS coverage and requirements. In addition, 
China has built a complete coastal listening network similar to India with the plan of 
monitoring some 220,000 fishing vessels and integrated VTS-AIS, which includes small 
55 Vishwa Mohan, “AIS Transponders Now Made Must for all Fishing Vessels,” The Times of India, 
sec. India, July 12, 2009. 
56 “India’s Coastal Security Profile: The Official View.” Security-Risks, accessed January 17, 2014, 
http://www.security-risks.com/security-trends-south-asia/india-defence/india%E2%80%99s-coastal-
security-profile:-the-official-view-510.html  
57 “The EU System for Fisheries Controls,” European Commission, last modified October 28, 2014, 
accessed August 15, 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/control/technologies/index_en.htm  
58 “Automatic Identification System (AIS) for Fishing Vessels,” August 12, 2014, accessed August 15, 
2014 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/automatic-identification-system-ais-for-fishing-vessels  
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commercial vessels is already in place in South Korea.59 Countries around the world are 
finding that AIS technology provides a cost effective approach to improving maritime 
domain awareness, safety, and security. 
H. SUMMARY  
To summarize this chapter, the various AIS systems together provide extensive 
worldwide coverage; however, small private boats are outside U.S. carriage requirements 
for AIS equipment. The international community is embracing AIS technology for the 
improved safety and security it offers at a reasonable price and implementing regulations 
for use by the small vessel community. In the proposed rulemaking process for expanding 
AIS, the Federal Register describes AIS as a major contributor of information needed for 
maritime domain awareness. In 2008, the Coast Guard stated, “ultimately we believe all 
vessels should avail themselves of AIS,”60 and this is the direction being taken by many 
countries. The reason the requirement has not been expanded to all vessels is the Coast 
Guard only mandates AIS on vessels as directed by Congress via the Maritime 
Transportation Safety Act,61 and this law is the basis for the expanded AIS regulations 
that are pending implementation. Currently, there are no requirements for small vessels to 
carry and broadcast AIS in the U.S. and that is the issue. A policy analysis of 
requirements for all vessels, regardless of size, to install Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) equipment and transmit vessel specific information via AIS when on international 
voyages that cross U.S. maritime borders will be conducted in Chapter III.  
 
 
59 Ben Ellison, “AIS on Fire Worldwide, & Hello AIS MOB Tech,” Panbo, May 3, 2010, accessed 
March 24, 2014, http://www.panbo.com/archives/2010/05/
ais_on_fire_worldwide_hello_ais_mob_tech.html  
60 U. S. Coast Guard, “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” 76301. 
61 Ibid. 
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III. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
This chapter lays out policy options for improving maritime border security using 
AIS. The three options investigated are: status quo, Class A or B AIS, and Class E AIS. 
After an overview of the policy is presented, the maritime security benefits and estimated 
costs of these policy options are developed to assist in cost benefit analysis.  
A. STATUS QUO 
To establish a baseline for the existing process and conditions for conducting 
international voyages to and from the U.S. the current laws, rules, and regulations are 
reviewed in this status quo section. The maritime security effectiveness of our current 
regulations are reviewed and both financial and security impacts are estimated.   
1. Overview 
Operators of all small pleasure craft, regardless of size, on international voyages 
arriving in the United States are required to report their entrance immediately to U. S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as per Reports of Arrival of Vessels (19 CFR 
4.2).62 A voyage is considered international when arriving in the United States from a 
foreign port or place, including any vessel that has visited a hovering vessel or received 
merchandise outside the territorial sea. A hovering vessel is defined as a vessel loitering 
offshore often with the intent to introduce merchandise into the United States illegally. 
Departing the United States and transiting international or foreign waters without a call at 
a foreign port is not considered an international voyage. Therefore, “fishing vessels, 
cruises to nowhere, or any vessel that leaves from a United States port and returns 
without calling a foreign port or place, has not departed the United States.”63 Pursuant to 
the Scope of Examination (8 CFR 235.1), an application to lawfully enter the United 
States must be made in person to a CBP officer at a U.S. port-of-entry.64 The vessel 
62 Reports of Arrival of Vessels, 19 C.F.R. 4.2, 1993. 
63 U. S. Customs and Border Protection, “Pleasure Boat Reporting Requirements.” 
64 Ibid. 
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master must contact CBP telephonically and be “directed to the nearest Port of Entry to 
satisfy the face-to-face requirement, or report to the nearest designated reporting location 
along with the boat’s passengers for inspection.”65 Customs and Border Protection 
establishes specific reporting locations for recreational boaters to report their arrival and 
be inspected.  
CBP continues to work to reduce barriers to fast, efficient, and secure travel to 
and from the U.S. and implemented several programs, including Alternate Inspection 
Systems, to facilitate entry requirements and streamline the processing of recreational 
boaters return to the U.S. All of these arrival-reporting programs are based on a self-
reporting system where mariners phone in their arrivals to CBP to comply with Report of 
Arrival of Vessels, Vehicles, and Aircraft (19 USC 1433).66 In each of these programs, 
CBP retains the right to direct mariners to report for a physical inspection. These 
programs are summarized below: 
a. NEXUS  
NEXUS is a joint venture between Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that offers facilitated customs and 
immigration clearance for low-risk recreational boaters entering either country through 
registration into the program. NEXUS registration is valid for five years and satisfies the 
boat operator’s legal requirement to report to a port-of-entry for face-to-face inspection, 
but boaters must still phone in their arrival. Approved applicants are issued a photo-
identification and proximity radio frequency identification (RFID) card that allows them 
to cross the border with a minimum of customs and immigration questioning.67 
b. Canadian Border Boat Landing Permit (I-68) 
Another alternative inspection system is the Canadian Border Boat Landing 
Permit (I-68) that allows recreational boaters to enter the U. S. from Canada. Applicants 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 U. S. Customs and Border Protection, “NEXUS Program Description,” accessed July 17, 2014, 
http://www.cbp.gov/travel/trusted-traveler-programs/nexus/nexus-overview  
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are inspected and issued an I-68 permit valid for the entire boating season. The I-68 
permits boaters to report their arrival telephonically without having to appear at a port-of-
entry for an in person inspection. The process to obtain an I-68 permit “involves an 
interview, checking the individual in the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) 
and possibly other law enforcement databases, completion of the form I-68, and payment 
of the fee.”68 Each person aboard the vessel older than 14 years of age must obtain his or 
her own I-68 permit and “the names and dates of birth of children less than 14 years of 
age must be listed on one or both of their parents’ Form I-68.”69 The Form I-68 is valid 
for one year and will bear the photograph and fingerprint of the applicant for 
identification purposes.  
c. Outlying Area Reporting System  
Outlying Area Reporting System (OARS) is another northern border method for 
boaters to report entry to satisfy reporting requirements into the United States from 
Canada. The OARS program uses videophones, located at public marinas, which boaters 
use to report their arrival. The system is “comprised of an AutoDial telephone, a video 
transceiver, a monitor, a facial camera and a document camera”70 that allows both the 
traveler and the officer to view one another as the inspection is taking place. Typically, 
“OARS reporting satisfies the in-person inspection requirement, but a CBP Officer may 
direct a boater to report to a port-of-entry or designated location for an in-person 
inspection.”71  
d. Small Vessel Reporting System  
The Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS) is the latest program that facilitates 
customs and immigration clearance for low risk recreational boaters; it is an outgrowth of 
the CBP’s Local Boater Option. The SVRS was initially piloted in Florida starting in 
68 U. S. Customs and Border Protection, “Canadian Border Boat Landing (I-68) Program,” accessed 
October 7, 2014, http://www.cbp.gov/travel/pleasure-boats-private-flyers/cbbl 
69 Ibid. 
70 Blue Seas, “U. S. Customs and Border Protection,” Blue Seas, accessed October 7, 2014, 
http://www.offshoreblue.com/cruising/us-customs.php  
71 U. S. Customs and Border Protection, “Pleasure Boat Reporting Requirements.” 
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2010 and fielded to all offices by the end of 2011. Enrollment in SVRS is voluntary, but 
boaters benefit by the expedited arrival reporting process. The program satisfies the 
vessel operator’s legal requirement to report for a face-to-face interview at a port-of-
entry, but boaters must still phone in their arrival.72 The SVRS is a web-based automated 
on-line reporting system created to streamline the small boat international arrival process. 
Mariners complete an application to participate on line that includes the scheduling of an 
appointment for a face-to-face interview with a CBP officer to complete the registration 
process.73 Program participants are required to provide digital fingerprints and a 
photograph for identification purposes. Upon returning to the U. S., the master must 
contact CBP immediately upon arrival; provide her or his specific SVRS number, 
identifying biographical information, and information as directed by the acceptance letter 
to the SVRS program:  
The master of a pleasure boat arriving from foreign is required to contact 
CBP via telephone immediately upon arrival (pursuant to 19 CFR 4.2 and 
8 CFR 235.1) and make an oral declaration for themselves and all 
passengers on the boat concerning any goods purchased or acquired while 
abroad (19 CFR 148.11 and 148.12). The master is also required to report 
in-person at the nearest port-of-entry (POE) within 24 hours to submit the 
necessary documentation to verify identity and lawful immigration status 
(pursuant to 8 USC 1321 and 1323). For more detailed information about 
the CBP requirements for pleasure boaters, please visit our website at 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/pleasure_boats/boats/svrs.xml.74  
The requirement to report within 24 hours may be waived by CBP as the letter 
also states; “CBP will verify that the master and occupants of the vessel are SVRS 
participants and determine whether the master’s telephonic arrival notification satisfies 
the inspection requirements or whether further inspection is necessary.”75 CBP retains 
the authority to board and inspect any vessel and its occupants arriving from any foreign 
port and conducts random inspections of SVRS participants.  
72 U. S. Customs and Border Protection, “Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS),” accessed October 
6, 2014, http://www.cbp.gov/travel/pleasure-boats-private-flyers/svrs  
73 Ibid. 
74 U. S. Customs and Border Protection, “Sample CBP SVRS Acceptance Letter,” accessed October 6, 
2014, https://svrs.cbp.dhs.gov/Documents/SampleAcceptanceForm.pdf  
75 Ibid. 
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A key element of the SVRS program is the online float plan that captures 
biographical information for all persons intending to travel, vessel registration 
information, and voyage itinerary information; once a float plan is entered online at the 
SVRS website and activated, SVRS will issue a float plan number. Upon return to the 
United States, the mariner will contact CBP via a dedicated telephone line where the CBP 
officer or an automated attendant will ask the standard questions on a customs declaration 
form and provide the mariner with their arrival number, or refer the vessel to a 
predetermined inspection site for a CBP inspection.76  
2. Maritime Border Security Effectiveness 
The maritime border security mission is complex and challenging; the maritime 
domain is an expansive pathway to the world without fences that connects to more than 
95,000 miles of U.S. shoreline.77 This presents unique challenges and enforcing the law 
is difficult, especially when nefarious individuals intend to ignore it. A recent GAO 
report states, “Law enforcement agencies face the challenge of distinguishing between 
legitimate small vessel operators and the relatively few individuals estimated to be 
engaged in illicit activities.”78 CBP estimates that only a small percentage of the vessels 
returning to the U. S. report arrival information as required by the law. According to 
CBP, “this low level of compliance is due, in part, to a lack of (1) public awareness of the 
reporting requirements, and (2) inspections to emphasize and ensure compliance.”79 
The NEXUS, I-68, and OARS alternate inspection systems operate only along the 
U.S./Canadian border and provide some efficiency to both the mariner and CBP but add 
no increased security. The latest program, SVRS, is open to the entire U.S. maritime 
community and does provide some security benefits. The SVRS captures biographical 
76 U. S. Customs and Border Protection, Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS). 
77 Written Testimony of CBP Office of Air and Marine Assistant Commissioner Randolph Alles for a 
House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security Hearing Titled 
What Does a Secure Maritime Border Look Like? 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of Randolf Alles, U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol Office of Air and Marine Assistant Commissioner), accessed October 7, 2014 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/11/19/written-testimony-cbp-house-homeland-security-subcommittee-
border-and-maritime 
78 Caldwell, Maritime Security DHS Could Benefit, 1. 
79 Ibid. 
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and vessel data when mariners sign up for the program and the float plan increases 
awareness of small vessels approaching the U. S. This information can be reviewed in 
advance allowing CBP to determine if a face-to-face inspection is desired.80 Segregating 
low risk vessels using the SVRS program “facilitates legitimate recreational boater traffic 
and increases CBP’s ability to identify higher risk vessels and dedicate resources to 
address illicit maritime activities.”81  
The SVRS increases maritime security through the implementation of advanced 
data submission and increased reporting compliance. In the 2013 GAO report, the 
following participation statistics are presented: total participants—30,190, registered 
vessels—11,189, and float plans—5,862.82 Almost 80 percent of the participants operate 
in the waters off of Florida, and CBP estimates this is a result of the program beginning 
there and replacing the CBP Local Boater Option.  
The SVRS was implemented after the existing alternate compliance programs 
along the northern border were enacted and fully implemented. With low participation in 
the SVRS, the boaters along the northern border with Canada appear reluctant to change 
from the existing programs. The distances between the U. S. and Canada are extremely 
short in some areas, allowing for quick international trips. The I-68 permit is good for a 
year and once that initial inspection is complete, a vessel could enter the U. S. without 
inspection on subsequent trips. Mariners along the northern border appear reluctant to 
change to a program that requires a float plan for every trip.  
3. Cost Benefit Considerations 
Determining cost benefit of government policies and actions is a challenging 
endeavor. For this thesis, risk reduction and financial costs are examined to determine the 
fiscal impacts of actions and to what extent those efforts reduce the risk to the public and 
our country.   
80 Ibid. 
81 Written Testimony of CBP Office of Air and Marine Assistant Commissioner Randolph Alles. 
82 Caldwell, Maritime Security DHS Could Benefit, 1. 
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a. Risk Reduction 
Traditional cost-benefit analysis has difficulty dealing with security issues, as the 
metrics are uncertain or extremely difficult to quantify. Past studies in the transportation 
arena have looked at safety and not security, yet these are fundamentally different issues, 
as safety is associated with risk while security is associated with uncertainty. 
Determining “probabilities to intentional acts is particularly problematic because of the 
possibility of strategic behavior: terrorists adapt their strategy to changes in the security 
environment in which they operate.”83 Uncertainty makes economic analysis difficult. 
The tools developed to determine risk costs, on the basis of historical accidents, cannot be 
applied to events that are uncertain. Additionally, “terrorists adjust their strategies 
according to the security measures taken, something that does not happen in relation to 
accidents.”84 When dealing with the uncertainty of security and terrorism, intelligence 
agencies exist to help avoid strategic surprise, as the foremost goal of any intelligence 
community “must be to keep track of threats, forces, events, and developments that are 
capable of endangering the nation’s existence.”85 The following from the December 2008 
International Transport Forum Conference frames the challenges of cost-benefit analysis 
within the security environment. 
An extreme view is that the risk management paradigm and 
economic analysis in general are not suitable for the support of 
security policy, as it is not feasible to determine reasonable attack 
probabilities, the modeling of impacts is too sketchy to be useful, 
and it is not possible to say how effective measures are in reducing 
threats. Under these conditions, pursuing a quantitative assessment 
may lead to the adoption of measures that infringe on civil liberties 
or are otherwise poorly legitimated, while their benefits are 
questionable.86 
83 “Security, Risk Perception and Cost-Benefit Analysis Summary and Conclusions,” discussion paper 
2009-6 (International Transport Forum Roundtable, Pars, France, December 2008), 
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/discussionpapers/DP200906.pdf, 6.  
84 Ibid. 14. 
85 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: Sage/CQ Press, 
2012), 2. 
86 “Security, Risk Perception and Cost-Benefit Analysis Summary and Conclusions,” 9. 
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Cost benefit analysis of government actions is also complicated by limited 
performance measures. CBP and the USCG have faced challenges in developing 
meaningful performance measures of maritime border security. The GAO has determined 
that DHS and its component agencies have experienced the following challenges when 
measuring the performance of maritime border security:  
• Collecting complete, accurate, and reliable data. 
• Not always having or using performance information to manage their 
missions. 
• Developing and using performance measures that focus on outcomes.87 
John Mueller and Mark Stewart propose the benefit of a security measure is a 
function of three elements: Benefit = (probability of a successful attack) × (losses 
sustained in the successful attack) × (reduction in risk).88 The element within this 
calculation that will be considered in this analysis is the extent to which each option 
provides a reduction in risk. This aligns with the current DHS strategic priority and 
approach to expand risk-based security by shrinking the haystack. DHS understands that 
one size does not fit all when dealing with security and is looking to “expand efforts to 
identify low-risk travelers and cargo to focus security resources on those we know less 
about or those identified as higher risk.”89 These types of actions are being done now like 
TSA’s Pre-Check™ program where low risk travelers volunteer for background checks to 
take advantage of faster processing. The experts at the transportation security round table 
agreed, “risk-profiling in aviation screening, in order to concentrate resources where they 
are most needed whilst maintaining random checks on pre-screened passengers, is 
probably the key measure for achieving better levels of security from the resources 
spent.”90 Estimating the relative risk reduction of the various policy options provides a 
reasonable measure of beneficial effectiveness for comparative purposes. 
87 Stephen Caldwell, Maritime Security Progress and Challenges in Key DHS Programs to Secure the 
Maritime Borders (GAO 14-196-T), (U. S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 13–15. 
88 John Mueller, and Mark Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and 
Costs of Homeland Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 23–25. 
89 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 35. 
90 “Security, Risk Perception and Cost-Benefit Analysis Summary and Conclusions,” 14. 
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b. Cost Impacts 
Determining specific costs for individual events and incremental efforts of the 
federal government can be a challenge. Federal agencies capture funding requests and 
expenditures in a variety of methods. There are both fixed costs, like equipment, 
personnel, and infrastructure, and incremental costs such as operating expenses like fuel 
and maintenance. In the DHS Budget in Brief for Fiscal Year 2014, CBP lists broad 
categories like “Border Security and Control Between the Ports of Entry”91 with 
corresponding funding levels; individual programs like the SVRS are not identified. 
Numerous statistics are available on hours expended by both CBP and the USCG. An 
Internet search produces the following CBP data for the current year: “Office of Air and 
Marine (OAM) achieved 81,045 flight hours in aircraft and 125,131 underway hours in 
marine vessels.”92 The challenge in developing a cost benefit analysis comes from not 
being able to parse out to what extent the various funding, resource hours, and effort 
expended by various agencies support specific government programs or actions. When 
completing the report on the 10-year anniversary of the Maritime Transportation Safety 
Act, the GAO stated, “activities related to small vessel security activities are not 
specifically identified in the Coast Guard budget.”93 Funding for small vessel security 
activities are captured under the broad category of the Coast Guard’s ports, waterways, 
and coastal security mission.  
To counter the challenges of conducting a cost benefit analysis where both the 
costs and benefits are not well defined, this thesis looks at cost differentials when 
comparing alternatives. Differential costs between proposed alternate actions and the 
status quo can be calculated using known cost rates of specific resources. The USCG 
publishes standard hourly rates, both inside government and outside government costs, 
for personnel, cutters, aircraft, and small boats. A sample of these hourly standard rates is 
91 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 2014 (Washington, DC: 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 114. 
92 U. S. Customs and Border Protection, “Fact Sheet—Office of Air and Marine,” May 1, 2013, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/air_marine_6.pdf  
93 Caldwell, Maritime Security Progress and Challenges, 36. 
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provided in Table 1 from the Coast Guard Commandant Instruction 7310.1O published 
on 18 November 2013.94  
Table 1.   Hourly Standard Rates for Coast Guard Services95 
Resource Type Inside Government Outside Government 
Cutters: Hourly Rate Hourly Rate 
210 ft Cutter $5,460 $8,283 
87 ft Patrol Boat $3,098 $4,178 
Aircraft:   
HC-130 Fixed Wing $15,467 $20,830 
H-65 Helo $8,448 $11,937 
Small Boats:   
45 ft RBM $6,514 $8,859 
25 ft RBS $1,108 $1,571 
Personnel:   
Enlisted E-6 $56 $76 
Civilian GS-12 $66 $71 
 
 
CBP does not perform reimbursable services like the USCG and therefore has not 
developed reimbursable rates for activities performed. The 2014 DHS Budget in Brief 
documents 23,087 CBP personnel assigned to work border security and control between 
the ports of entry at a total cost of $3,319,657,000.96 Using a 40-hour workweek, this 
equates to an average hourly personnel cost of $78 per hour. CBP uses the General 
Schedule (GS) wage scale for field personnel; most agents start as a GS-5 and work up to 
GS-12. CBP’s necessity to work overtime, night shifts, and weekends increases salaries 
and personnel costs: night differential pay is 15 to 20 percent more, holidays are 50 
percent above normal pay, and overtime pay is twice the normal hourly wage.97 The 
94 U. S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Reimbursable Standard Rates (Commandant Instruction 7310.1O), 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013), accessed October 5, 2014, 
http://www.uscg.mil/directives/ci/7000-7999/CI_7310_1N.pdf, Encl 1.  
95 Ibid. 
96 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 2014, 114. 
97 “Customs and Border Protection Officer Careers,” BorderPatrolEdu, accessed October 6, 2014, 
http://www.borderpatroledu.org/us-customs/cbp-officer/  
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Coast Guard Commandant Instruction 7310.1O lists reimbursable rates for GS-5 to GS-
13 between $35 and $85 per hour. Considering the additional night differential and 
overtime costs of CBP personnel the average salary cost of $78 per hour is in alignment 
with published standard USCG personnel costs. Based on available data, CBP costs for 
personnel, vessel, and aircraft should be commensurate with those listed in the USCG 
reimbursable rate instruction.  
B. AIS CLASS A/B REQUIREMENT POLICY OPTION 
The status quo option provides the baseline for the current situation and process 
for small vessels returning to the U. S. This section looks at the potential policy option of 
requiring Class A or B AIS for improving maritime security of our borders.  
1. Overview 
This AIS Class A/B requirement policy option would require all vessels, 
regardless of size, that conduct international voyages to install and broadcast either Class 
A or Class B AIS. The policy would compel mariners to participate in the SVRS with the 
added requirement to install AIS. Class A or Class B AIS equipment and AIS identifiers 
would fulfill the obligation but AIS receive-only units, that is, vessels that do not transmit 
their own location would not meet the carriage requirement. AIS identifiers are fully 
integrated, battery powered, standalone AIS transceivers designed for reliable low cost 
vessel tracking. The identifier is fully inter-operable with all AIS systems and transmits 
complete AIS Class B messages; both GPS and VHF antennas are integrated within a 
toughened waterproof security shell.98 The units can be mounted to small vessels and 
provide worldwide tracking via the AIS capable satellite constellation as being 
implemented in Mexico. The primary disadvantage of identifiers is they do not display 
information about other AIS equipped vessels in the vicinity to the mariner. To provide 
other vessel tracking on board a ship, AIS A or B with an integrated display is necessary.  
98 SRT Marine, “AIS Identifier Class B Transceiver—Product Data Sheet,” accessed February 17, 
2014, http://www.srt-marine.com/products/oem/identifier-2/  
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2. Maritime Border Security Effectiveness 
Government agencies would be significantly more effective and efficient in 
securing our maritime borders if all vessels crossing the maritime border were 
broadcasting AIS. Under this proposal, in addition to installing the AIS equipment, the 
SVRS registration and float plan would include the vessels Maritime Mobile Service 
Identity (MMSI) number. An MMSI number is a unique identifier assigned to a boat. 
Only one number is assigned for all applicable electronics on the vessel, such as an AIS 
transceiver, digital selective calling (DSC) radio, and emergency position indicating radio 
beacon (EPIRB). MMSIs are “regulated and managed internationally by the International 
Telecommunications Union in Geneva, Switzerland, just as radio call signs are 
regulated.”99 In the U.S., a third party is required to program the boat’s data and MMSI 
number into the AIS transceiver; generally, this is the manufacturer. MMSI registration 
includes contact information to be used in case of an emergency. 
This policy option significantly improves maritime security over status quo as it 
tracks vessels crossing the border. The SVRS registration and float plan coupled with 
AIS delivers enough information for border security agencies to determine if, when, and 
where to conduct a boarding of the vessel. The addition of AIS to vessels conducting an 
international voyage shrinks the haystack by illuminating the compliant vessels and 
allowing law enforcement to target the dark contacts that are not transmitting AIS signals. 
To improve the detection of small dark contacts, governments and private industry 
continue to work on increasing maritime domain awareness using surveillance and high-
frequency (HF) radar, active and passive sonar, and satellite-based EO (electro-optical) 
and SAR (synthetic aperture radar) imagery.100 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO’s) Science and Technology Center is conducting a performance evaluation of 
various sensors to improve detection of maritime traffic anomalies and suspicious 
activities.101 
99 U. S. Coast Guard, “Navigation Center—Maritime Mobile Service Identity,” U. S. Department of 
Homeland Security, accessed October 6, 2014, http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=mtMmsi  
100 “Maritime Security—Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA).”  
101 Ibid. 
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The other alternate inspection programs along the northern border with Canada 
would also be significantly strengthened by the AIS requirement. Ideally, a float plan 
provides advance notice of movement but that may not be as critical when dealing with 
frequent and known travelers. Visibility of mariner identification and location via AIS 
provides maritime domain awareness and improves security. This option facilitates 
legitimate recreational boater traffic and allows law enforcement to more effectively use 
their limited resources to intercept and board small vessels transiting our maritime 
borders that are not broadcasting AIS.  
3. Cost Benefit Considerations 
As discussed above, determining the value of increased security actions and 
measures is never easy. Individuals make personal security decisions and choices daily: 
locking doors, putting up fences, purchasing home security systems, or turning on lights. 
Each person is conducting an analysis within a cost benefit framework when he or she 
makes these decisions about the purchase of a dog or home security monitoring system. 
As with personal decisions, not everyone will agree on the best or optimal approach 
regarding government actions to improve security. Requiring AIS on vessels making 
international voyages does produce risk reduction by reducing the size of the haystack, 
and therefore a benefit to security as presented by Mueller and Stewart.102 The cost to the 
mariner for this policy would be between $500 to $1000 for a Class B AIS transceiver 
and $1,500 to $3,000 for a Class A AIS transceiver. For this expense, the mariner is 
likely to receive a more efficient border crossing experience that could be accomplished 
without a face-to-face interview as is accomplished now via the alternate inspection 
programs. The U.S. government could automate the float plan database to monitor AIS 
data feed and alert CBP well in advance of the vessel’s arrival when completing an 
international voyage and eliminate the requirement for a phone call by the mariner.  
The risk reduction benefits of this policy option to the government from shrinking 
the haystack come from having knowledge of the vessel’s identification, position, course, 
and speed as well as persons aboard once the associated float plan is accessed. Less time 
102 Mueller, and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money, 23–25. 
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and effort would need to be expended detecting and identifying the vessel as it conducts 
the border crossing. The pre-departure float plan would provide government agencies 
time to assess any threat from the personnel aboard the small boat as is done now for 
commercial vessels. The Coast Guard currently “screens ships, crews, and passengers for 
all vessels required to submit a 96-hour Advance Notice of Arrival (ANOA) prior to 
entering a U.S. port.”103 The Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers also screen 
commercial vessels for suspicious indicators based on “ownership, ownership 
associations, cargo, and previous activity.”104 The pre-screening of the vessel and 
personnel filed via the float plan could be done at the USCG Maritime Intelligence 
Fusion Center or CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC). DHS Science and 
Technology (S&T) Directorate is prototyping a Coastal Surveillance System (CSS) to 
improve maritime domain awareness and the detection of small dark maritime contacts. 
The CSS prototype has been established at the CBP AMOC in Riverside, California 
(CA). Additionally, the CSS is intended to provide an affordable command, control, 
communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
solution to decision makers to improve coordination, response, and joint tactical 
operations.105 The program optimizes the use of limited resources available to interdict 
targets by improving abilities to detect, classify, track, and interdict small vessels. The 
primary purpose of CSS is to collect and share inputs from disparate sensors to improve 
the detection of targets and support a coordinated response.106 AIS signals from all 
vessels transiting our maritime borders would be an integral part of this new CSS and 
103 Written Testimony of U.S. Coast Guard Deputy for Operations Policy & Capabilities Rear 
Admiral William Lee for a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and 
Maritime Security Hearing Titled “What Does a Secure Border Look Like?” 113th Cong. (2013) 
(testimony of .S. Coast Guard Deputy for Operations Policy & Capabilities Rear Admiral William Lee), 
accessed August 10, 2014 http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/02/26/written-testimony-us-coast-guard-house-
committee-homeland-security-subcommittee  
104 Ibid. 
105 Edward Lundquist, “Networking Sensors: Coastal Surveillance System Sheds Light on ‘Dark 
Targets’ for More Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness,” Sea Power 56, no. 10 (2013): 32. 
106 Thomas Tomaiko, “Overview of the Coastal Surveillance System” (PowerPoint presentation at 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Maritime West Security 
Conference, Long Beach, CA, August 2013). 
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increase the efficiency and effectiveness of, and reduce costs associated with, enforcing 
security of our maritime borders.  
As marine air and surface assets patrol the border, less time is required to detect, 
identify, intercept, and board vessels crossing the border. Law enforcement agencies do 
not have to board the vessel to determine the purpose of the voyage and who’s aboard, as 
this information is now available in the float plan filed by the mariner. The potential 
government savings of this policy option using the inside government hourly rates are 
estimated in the Table 2. Costs vary depending on the type of asset used to complete the 
event. In addition, government savings come from not having to complete the events 
listed in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Estimated Government Costs for Specific Actions 
Event Time Cost Range Est 
Detection/Identification via Aircraft 15 min $2,000 to $4,000 
Intercept/Board via Cutter or Small Boat 60 min $3,000 to $5,500 
Boarding (2 person team) 30 min $60 
Total:  $5,060 to $9,560 
 
C. AIS CLASS E REQUIREMENT POLICY OPTION 
This policy option would allow Class E AIS to meet the AIS carriage requirement 
when conducting international voyages. Class E AIS is a recently launched cellphone 
application supported by DHS Science and Technology Directorate that provides many 
features that improve mariner safety. Chuck Benton, the owner and chief technical officer 
of Technology Systems Inc., creator of Smart Chart AIS, recently stated, “Smart Chart 
AIS could potentially lead to smoother international border crossings and possibly even 
reduce the risks of a routine Coast Guard stop, if people are willing to share their 
tracks.”107  
107 David Schmidt, “Smart Chart AIS: Vessel Tracking for Generation E,” Yatching, June 19, 2014, 
accessed November 20, 2014, http://www.yachtingmagazine.com/smart-chart-ais-vessel-tracking-
generation-e 
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1. Overview 
Class E AIS operates over the cellular phone network and not VHF-FM or 
satellite and provides visibility of Class A and B AIS data via Internet data and not 
directly from other vessels in the vicinity.108 As a smart phone app, the device is mobile 
and not mounted to a specific vessel but it can be associated with a vessel for 
identification purposes. The Smart Chart application and service does not use MMSI 
numbers for identification and tracking.  
2. Maritime Border Security Effectiveness 
The Class E AIS option provides a slight increase in maritime domain awareness 
and border security over status quo; however, not having the cell phone physically 
attached or associated with a specific vessel like AIS equipment is a significant 
drawback. Phones could be moved between vessels and provide misinformation if 
mariners intend to circumvent the requirements. A formal registration process as done by 
the assignment of an MMSI number to each AIS device is important to maintain fidelity 
of the information in the database. Law enforcement agencies would only see vessels that 
were operating in areas with cell phone coverage. Cellphone towers near the coastline 
provide limited offshore coverage, but even so, it is not considered reliable for tracking 
vessels as they transit the border. Although the Coast Guard would respond to phone calls 
for help from mariners, it is not the preferred equipment as “cell phones may have gaps in 
coverage, especially in coastal waters, leading to dropped calls and bad reception.”109 
Although both cell phones and VHF-FM radios use line-of-sight technology, DSC (VHF-
FM) equipped radios are the preferred system for maritime communications since VHF 
signals are much stronger than the signals of most cell phones and VHF radios transmit 
the AIS signals and data. With waterproof GPS integrated DSC radios available below 
$200, they cost less than a smartphone and can be registered with a MMSI number for 
rapid identification and location of the caller. At the touch of a button, a DSC-equipped 
VFH radio would send an automated distress call using the mariners’ unique MMSI 
108 “Need Maritime Security? There’s an App for That.”  
109 John D. Miller, “On the Water and in Distress?” Sailing World, January 2013, accessed October 6, 
2014, http://www.sailingworld.com/water-and-distress 
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number. According to Miller, “Given the comparable price but the incomparable 
advantages of VHF-FM, it seems that on the water, VHF is the smarter technology.”110 
This option provides limited security benefits as it shrinks less of the haystack and 
encourages mariners to shift to cell phones away from VHF-FM based radios and AIS 
producing undesirable and negative safety impacts.  
3. Cost Benefit Considerations 
The smart phone application (app) is free but requires the purchase of a phone and 
service contract. Over time, these costs would exceed $1,000, therefore, purchasing a 
Class B AIS transceiver would make better financial sense. With the limited cell phone 
coverage of the border region as compared to the coverage of VHF-FM and satellite 
based AIS equipment, the government would receive limited and inconsistent benefits 
from a Class E AIS policy option. Vessels using a cell phone based AIS are not displayed 
on Class A or B AIS equipment and therefore do not appear to be in compliance with the 
requirement. Law enforcement agencies would have to take the same actions with 
associated costs to detect, identify, intercept, and board these vessels as if they were not 
participating and any potential savings are lost. The mariner would also be frustrated that 
his voyage is interrupted while complying with the government regulation.  
For the reasons stated above, Class E AIS is not considered an effective option for 
improving maritime security in the border region. It provides very limited additional 
security over status quo, does not communicate directly with AIS equipment so other 
mariners and law enforcement agencies cannot see the vessel using Class E AIS, has 
coverage limited to areas with cell phone signals, and encourages unsafe practices by 
relying on cell phones over VHF-FM radios. This smartphone app is an excellent tool for 
mariners who remain within U.S. internal waters with adequate cell phone coverage, but 
it is not effective for international voyages. The AIS Class E policy option is being 
excluded from further consideration and will not be included in the next chapter on 
analysis and comparison.  
110 Ibid. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON 
With the elimination of AIS Class E as a viable policy option, this chapter will 
focus on the benefits and impacts of requiring Class A or Class B AIS on all vessels 
conducting international voyages as compared to the status quo. Requiring AIS on all 
vessels, regardless of size, that cross our maritime borders improves security and safety. 
This action is in alignment with DHS’s strategic priorities to shrink the haystack and 
expand risk based security operations as outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review.111  
A. SECURITY BENEFITS AND COST IMPACTS 
The SVRS that requires vessel and personnel registration and a float plan coupled 
with AIS linked to the vessel via an MMSI number provides a system that improves 
security and facilitates legitimate traffic across the border. The float plan specifies 
advance notice of movement/arrival, and AIS provides mariner identification and 
tracking to yield increased security and maritime domain awareness. Vessels and aircraft 
patrolling the border routinely receive AIS information over VHF-FM radio signals prior 
to either radar or visual contact. This allows law enforcement agencies to more 
effectively use assets patrolling the border to intercept and board small vessels transiting 
our maritime borders that are not broadcasting AIS. With this option, expensive resource 
hours are not expended to detect, interdict, and identify vessels broadcasting AIS. An AIS 
requirement will significantly improve compliance by mariners returning to the U.S., as 
the system can be configured to automatically report arrival information as required by 
law. As vessels are intercepted crossing the border without AIS, education and 
enforcement action will increase public awareness of the requirements and emphasize 
and ensure compliance. 
AIS equipment costs between $500 and $3,000, depending on the options and 
capabilities of the specific device purchased. It is expected that most mariners would 
purchase the Class B device that costs between $500 and $1,000. AIS makes government 
111 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. 
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enforcement operations significantly more efficient when coupled with the SVRS 
registration and a float plan as border security agencies do not need to detect, interdict, 
identify, and board these vessels as they cross the border. The government could expend 
in excess of $5,000 per event to complete these actions, depending on the resources used. 
For a relatively small investment by the private mariner, the government receives 
significant financial return and a more efficient government produces benefits to all 
taxpayers. The mariners would benefit from a more efficient border crossing experience 
and increased safety during their voyage.  
The concern that AIS intrudes on personal freedom by tracking mariner 
movements is countered by the increased security received by the nation. This is an issue 
that must be balanced, as absolute security is unattainable and absolute freedom is simply 
anarchy. Finding the right balance between what freedoms are worth giving up for 
increased security is the challenge. In general, when dealing with border security the 
scale tips away from personal freedom, as we want to regulate who is allowed to enter the 
country.  
B. AVIATION COMPARISON—A RIGOROUS AND VETTED SYSTEM 
Currently, mariners have the most relaxed and unregulated process for crossing 
the border.112 A comparison to private aviation requirements for border crossings 
supports implementing an AIS requirement coupled with a float plan for mariners to 
mimic the flight plan and transponder requirements of aviation travel. A review of both 
current and future aviation requirements is provided next.  
1. Current Requirements 
Requiring the use of AIS coupled with a float plan for all vessels conducting an 
international voyage is commensurate with the current requirements for international 
civilian aviation travel. Title 14, Part 99 of the Code of Federal Regulations covering 
security control of aircraft codifies the requirements for flying aircraft into or out of the 
U.S. or across an air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Section 99.9 prescribes that a 
112 Etzioni, “The Joke is on Air Travelers.” 
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“person who operates a civil aircraft into an ADIZ must have a functioning two-way 
radio, and the pilot must maintain a continuous listening watch on the appropriate 
aeronautical facility’s frequency.”113 Additionally, Section 99.11 requires that a flight 
plan be filed, activated, and closed with the appropriate aeronautical facility. Moreover, 
Section 99.13 directs the use of a transponder with Mode C when flying “into or out of 
the United States, or into, within, or across an ADIZ.”114 Civilian aircraft must transmit a 
discrete code assigned by the local air traffic control center on Mode C for their specific 
flight when crossing the border either northbound or southbound. Furthermore, Section 
99.15 requires the pilot to make a position report to the appropriate aeronautical facility 
15 minutes prior to entering the ADIZ.115  
These requirements allow law enforcement agencies to monitor the movements of 
private aircraft as they conduct border crossings and meet them upon arrival for a 
customs inspection. It is reasonable to impose and enforce a similar process on private 
vessels that conduct border crossings. Requiring mariners to file a float plan and transmit 
AIS would create a system that is essentially in effect now for the aviation community. 
The costs of an aircraft Mode C transponder is on par with the costs of an AIS Class A 
transceiver:; $2,000 to $3,000. Private aviators accept this as the process and cost for 
international air travel and have not raised concerns about the requirement intruding on 
their freedom.  
2. Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Requirements 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued requirements in May 2010 
mandating that aircraft flying in certain controlled airspace be equipped with Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) “Out” avionics beginning January 1, 
2020.116 ADS-B is a major component of the FAA’s Next Generation Air Transportation 
113 “Title 14, chap 1, sub chap. F, Part 99—Security Control of Air Traffic,” Electronic Code of 




116 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, Out Equipment and Use, 14 C.F.R. 91.225. 
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System (NextGen) that transitions air traffic control from radar to a GPS satellite-based 
surveillance system. With each aircraft broadcasting key flight data, ADS-B significantly 
enhances air traffic surveillance capabilities and will be required in all airspace where 
Mode C is currently mandated. With ADS-B, controllers can see aircraft with much 
greater precision, accuracy, and reliability as aircraft equipped with ADS-B send their 
precise, GPS-derived location to radio stations on the ground where controllers are able 
to see information such as aircraft speed, altitude, and identity.117 Aircraft with ADS-B 
“In” capabilities can also receive these signals and have awareness of other aircraft and 
properly equipped ground equipment in their vicinity improving overall safety.  
There has been some controversy regarding the cost verses benefit of ADS-B for 
small private aircraft; yet, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) supports 
ADS-B in concept and has embraced this transition from ground-based radar to a GPS 
satellite system.118 With a 10-year phase in period, AOPA plans to work closely with the 
FAA to ensure that pilots can identify the benefits of ADS-B and comply with the new 
rules with affordable avionics.119 In October 2014, Garmin announced an ADS-B 
compliant system, GDL-84, with a suggested retail price of $3,995. The GDL 84  
… provides an all-inclusive, minimally intrusive solution for aircraft 
owners looking to satisfy the requirements of NextGen, while providing 
the benefits offered by ADS-B In without the need to significantly modify 
the panel of the aircraft or the need for a multifunction display.120  
The GDL-84 has an optional wireless ADS-B In display to receive and display traffic and 
weather.  
117 “Fact Sheet—Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B),” news release, Federal 
Aviation Administration, August 13, 2014, accessed October 7, 2014, http://www.faa.gov/news/
fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsid=16874  
118 “Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B),” Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, 
accessed October 8, 2014, http://www.aopa.org/Advocacy/Air-Traffic-Services-,-a-,-Technology/Air-
Traffic-Services-Brief-Automatic-Dependent-Surveillance-Broadcast-ADS-B  
119 Ibid. 
120 Jessica Koss, “Garmin® Introduces New Cost-Effective ADS-B Solution for General Aviation,” 
Business Wire, October 28, 2014, http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20141028005398/en/
Garmin%C2%AE-Introduces-Cost-Effective-ADS-B-Solution-General-Aviation#.VFBlQvTF_6I 
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When Malaysia Airlines flight MH 370 disappeared in March 2014, it 
reinvigorated the discussion of aircraft tracking equipment and requirements. ADS-B 
broadcasts an aircraft’s identity, position, and flight data but is currently only available 
when in range of an ADS-B ground station. Flight MH 370 was equipped with and 
initially broadcasting ADS-B, but there were insufficient ground stations in the area to 
receive the aircrafts signal. The live flight tracking program, FlightAware, “operates a 
worldwide network of ADS-B receivers that track ADS-B-equipped aircraft flying 
around the globe” to supplement the various government radar feeds and provide 
improved flight tracking services.121 FlightAware’s current ground stations for receiving 
ADS-B signals in the area where MH 370 was flying are shown in Figure 3.122 
 
Figure 3.  ADS-B Coverage from FlightAware 
FlightAware is actively seeking individuals and sites to install ADS-B receivers to 
improve worldwide coverage as “new sites all around the world are beneficial and data 
121 “FlightAware and ADS-B,” Flightware, accessed November 17, 2014, https://flightaware.com/
adsb/ 
122 Ibid.  
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will be used from any contributing facility. Even in places where coverage exists already, 
more redundancy and overlapping coverage results in significantly better low-altitude 
coverage and coverage reliability.”123 Malaysia is also “implementing ADS-B 
surveillance to improve coverage of certain air routes that do not have complete radar 
coverage. This entails installing two ADS-B ground stations at radar sites in Pulau 
Langkawi and Genting Highland.”124 Commercial flight-tracking services that use ADS-
B are the aviation counterpart to Marine Traffic website as shown in Figure 1 in Chapter 
II. Similar to AIS, there is now a market for worldwide tracking of aircraft, and 
commercial companies are working on installing ADS-B antenna and receiver systems in 
satellites for tracking aircraft from space where the “final objective is to deploy a full 
satellite constellation able to track any aircraft on earth.”125 
ADS-B is the aviation equivalent to AIS and provides improved efficiency, 
safety, and security with eventual worldwide coverage. The safety and security benefits 
outweigh public concern over cost or invasion of privacy by tracking individual aircraft, 
as FAA has implemented the ADS-B regulations with minimal objections. When ADS-B 
is fully implemented, FAA will secure some secondary surveillance radars but will retain 
primary radars for homeland defense purposes.126 Primary radars will allow FAA to see 
aircraft within the ADIZ that are not broadcasting ADS-B and launch military aircraft to 
intercept as is done currently when aircraft approach our borders without a flight plan or 
transmitting an assigned transponder Mode C code. Requiring all vessels to broadcast 
AIS as they transit our maritime borders fully aligns with what FAA has implemented for 
aircraft.  
123 Ibid. 
124 “MH370 Mystery Points to Need for Better Aircraft Tracking,” Aviation Week, March 14, 2014, 
accessed October 29, 2014, http://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/mh370-mystery-points-need-
better-aircraft-tracking  
125 “Satellite ADS-B,” Innovative Solutions in Space, accessed November 17, 2014, 
http://www.isispace.nl/cms/index.php/projects/s-ads-b  
126 “Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B).”  
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C. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND CONCERNS 
A stakeholder analysis will help one deal with political forces through a rational 
approach when implementing a new policy or change. According to Mintzberg, 
Ahlstrand, and Lampel, “In a sense, it is the planning school’s solution to the messiness 
of politics.”127 This approach begins with the analysis of behavior of the stakeholders, 
then understanding the logic behind this behavior, and finally searching for possible 
coalitions among several stakeholders.128 
1. Impact to Mariners 
AIS equipment costs between $500 and $3,000 depending on the options and 
capabilities of the specific device purchased. Many small vessel owners will not want to 
expend funds to meet this requirement regardless of the benefits derived. Some boat 
owners and non-boat owners will also protest the government’s intrusion into their 
privacy by tracking their movements using this technology, as the satellite-based systems 
have worldwide tracking capabilities. To counter privacy concerns, legislation could 
allow mariners to turn AIS off, or place it in receive only, when conducting voyages that 
do not cross our international maritime borders. If a voyage takes place entirely within 
internal U.S. waters, the vessel could broadcast but would not be required to do so. Some 
mariners could also choose to secure or place AIS in receive only while transiting areas 
where they would not want to broadcast for security reasons, such as around eastern 
Africa. Opposition to any AIS requirement is expected from a vocal minority of lobbyists 
paid by the various boating organizations who describe their activities as: “Boat U.S. uses 
the collective strength of its over 500,000 members to fight against unfair taxes and 
regulations, all the while advocating sound public policy that promotes safe, responsible 
boating.”129  
127 Henry Mintzberg, Bruce W. Ahlstrand and Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour 
through the Wilds of Strategic Management (New York: Free Press, 1998), Kindle edition, location 3524. 
128 Ibid. 
129 “Boat US Government Affairs,” Boat Owners Association of the United States, 2014, accessed 
October 7, 2014 http://www.boatus.com/gov/about.asp 
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2. General Public Stakeholders 
A percentage of the general public would judge the proposed regulation is 
important to improve the security of the country. It is likely many in this security 
conscious group are not members of the boating community but believe this gap in 
national security should be closed. These proponents of security are expected to work in 
opposition to the small boat stakeholders by commenting in favor of the proposed 
regulation and contacting their political representatives directly and via lobbyists as well. 
Those concerned about closing this gap in our security would support this law yet the 
majority of the U. S. public will be apathetic towards this proposal as they judge it does 
not impact them.  
3. Review of Pending AIS Regulation Changes 
Reviewing the process of a similar proposed change to AIS regulations will 
illuminate how the public and stakeholders might react to this proposed law. The U. S. 
Coast Guard is currently updating AIS regulations to expand the equipment carriage 
requirements to additional commercial vessels. The estimate is the new regulation would 
impact about 17,500 commercial vessels as shown in the Table 3.130 
Table 3.   Vessels Impacted by the Pending AIS Regulations131 
Vessel Type Number 
Commercial Vsl greater than 65 ft and less than 300 GTons  2,973 
Commercial Fishing Vessel greater than 65 ft  5,520 
Towing Vessel greater than 26 ft and more than 600 HP  4,560 
Passenger Vessels  3,235 
Dredges    35 
Foreign Flag Vessels  1,119 
Total 17,442 
 
130 Jorge Arroyo, “Waterways Management” [PowerPoint], (AIS Rulemaking Briefing to the 
Navigation Safety Advisory Council at Savannah, GA, May 2009), U. S. Coast Guard, accessed February 
17, 2014, http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/pdf/AIS/Arroyo@NAVSAC(20090520).pdf  
131 Ibid.  
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Only 23 people provided comments at the two public meetings held to collect 
input on these proposed changes to AIS regulations. During the four-month open 
comment period, another 70 comments were submitted to the regulations.gov website.132 
Assuming only those impacted commented, less than 100 comments or about one half of 
one percent (0.005) of the 17,000 plus impacted mariners chose to provide comments. It 
is highly likely that members of the general public not impacted by this proposed 
regulation also provided comments, and this reduces the percent of impacted public 
commenting even further. This supports the position that the majority of the public and 
even those impacted would be apathetic towards this proposed regulation. Comments 
provided were typically negative and focused on the regulation not being needed within 
their specific vessel community. None of the comments provided produced a change in 
the proposed regulation.133  
4. National Small Vessel Security Summit Concerns 
In 2007, DHS engaged private, commercial, and government stakeholders over 
small vessel operations, safety, and security at the National Small Vessel Security 
Summit (NSVSS). At this summit, there was “considerable controversy over the role and 
status of the Automatic Identification System (AIS). Numerous recreational boating 
representatives were unequivocally opposed to applying AIS requirements to those 
vessels.”134 The stakeholders at the summit judged that AIS was too costly and 
impractical for recreational vessels and had minimal effect on security. In addition, 
attendees expressed concern that the government could not monitor AIS data with current 
resources and the system would be “easily compromised by terrorists.”135 Final remarks 
made by Mr. Richard Schwartz of the Boat Owners Association of the United States at 
the NSVSS are summarized as: 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Charles Brownstein et al., Report of the DHS National Small Vessel Security Summit (Washington, 
DC: Homeland Security Institute, 2007), accessed February 17, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assetts/
small_vessel_NSVSS_Report_HQ_508.pdf, 7. 
135 Ibid., 8. 
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Lastly, Boat U.S. uniformly and strongly opposed requiring recreational 
boaters to install any form of the Automatic Identification System (AIS). 
He stated three rational for his opposition to AIS: 1) potential terrorists 
would not comply with this identification requirement, 2) adding millions 
of recreational vessels AIS signatures would overwhelm the USCG’s 
ability to effectively monitor the system, and 3) the cost of such 
equipment for recreational boaters is prohibitive at a cost of $500 per 
device.136  
5. Improved Maritime Domain Awareness 
To counter the concerns from the 2007 NSVSS that the government lacks the 
ability to monitor AIS, the Coast Guard now has a network of AIS stations covering all 
major and most of the smaller ports around the country.137 Commercial satellite 
companies currently provide almost worldwide coverage of AIS signals and one 
company, exactEarth, reports it has over 100 customers on five continents including:138 
• The federal government of Canada, Department of National Defense 
• Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
• South African Maritime Safety Authority 
• U.S. Coast Guard  
• U.S. 6th Fleet  
• U.S. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
• United Kingdom Hydrographic Office 
Efforts are ongoing to leverage technology to improve the ability to monitor the 
world’s maritime traffic and provide the intelligence community’s maritime surveillance 
analysts the tools to identify suspicious activity.139 In addition, technology is rapidly 
improving our capability to obtain maritime domain awareness data through the use of 
synthetic aperture radar satellites (SARSAT) that can detect small targets, including the 
wakes of fast moving small vessels. A joint-capability technology demonstration is 
ongoing where SARSAT is being used to provide alerts on suspicious situations “such as 
136 Ibid., 55–56. 
137 Lundquist, Connecting the Dots, 22. 
138 C. Puddy, personal communication, August 13, 2014. 
139 “Maritime Security—Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA).”  
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at sea rendezvous or small, fast boats headed to an unusual location.”140 SARSAT 
technology is a critical step towards improving maritime domain awareness of non-
emitting and uncooperative vessels. Furthermore, it could provide the framework for a 
satellite-based system that can monitor the maritime border from space, recognize vessels 
transiting with an active AIS signal, and alert law enforcement when a vessel transits the 
border without broadcasting AIS.  
AIS critics are correct; terrorists will not comply with an equipment carriage 
requirement; however, if legitimate marine traffic is transmitting AIS, border security 
forces can be more effective and efficient. With AIS data and signals from registered 
mariners, SARSAT or other state of the art technology has the potential to provide cues 
to law enforcement agencies of terrorists and other criminals attempting to illegally cross 
our maritime borders. This is exactly what DHS is looking for with the shrinking 
haystack strategy. 
6. Estimated Public Costs 
Although there are about 12 million recreational vessels registered in the U. S., 
most of these are less than 26 feet in length and not likely to make an international 
voyage. The 2012 Recreational Boating Statistics shows approximately 610,000 small 
boats with a length of 26 feet or more registered in the U.S.141 The proposed regulation is 
anticipated to impact only a small percentage of the boating community as most boaters 
do not conduct international voyages. GAO report 14–32 listed approximately 30,000 
vessels registered in the SVRS.142 For impact analysis, an estimate of 100,000 vessels 
will be used; this is three times the number currently registered with CBP’s SVRS and 
about one sixth of the total number of small boats 26 feet or greater that are registered in 
the U.S. This estimate of 100,000 vessels owners who would be required to expend 
money to purchase required AIS equipment represents less than one percent of the total 
140 Lundquist, Connecting the Dots, 22. 
141 U.S. Coast Guard, 2012 Recreational Boating Statistics (COMDTPUB P16754.26) (Washington, 
DC: U. S. Coast Guard, 2013), 66. 
142 Caldwell, Maritime Security DHS Could Benefit, 26. 
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boat owners in the U.S. Based on $500 to $1000 per unit and 100,000 vessels impacted, 
the total cost to the public is estimated between $50 to $100 million.  
7. Marketing 
The use of marketing could sway some individuals if the idea is sound and 
implemented correctly. The key marketing elements of the requirement to install and 
broadcast AIS is the security that it provides to the nation, the safety it provides the 
individuals aboard the small boat, and the increased efficiency of a border crossing. 
Boater safety is improved by the increased visibility to other vessels in the area and the 
ability of rescuers to locate the small boat in times of distress. The desire to improve 
national security will tip the scale to implement this policy over the minor costs to boat 
owners and limited intrusion to their privacy as observed within the aviation community. 
The third concern from the NSVSS by Boat U.S. regarding AIS equipment costs could be 
mitigated with an incentive program.  
8. Incentive to Participate 
To further market a new AIS carriage requirement, a rebate incentive on the 
purchase of an AIS transceiver would encourage mariners to participate in the SVRS. 
With the significant savings the government obtains from having mariners purchase and 
install AIS equipment, a financial incentive program could be used to encourage 
mariners’ compliance. As the public registers for the SVRS and provides MMSI numbers 
for installed AIS equipment, the government could reimburse a partial amount to the 
mariner. Amounts between $100 and $250 would provide strong motivation for mariners 
to participate.  
The government has used financial incentives in the past to modify behavior and 
that practice continues those efforts today. For example, during the transition from analog 
to digital TV signals in 2009, two $40 coupons were offered to consumers to offset the 
cost of digital converters.143 Also in 2009, the federal government offered rebates for the 
purchase of more efficient vehicles via the Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS) or 
143 “Digital Converter Boxes,” PBS, accessed October 22, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/digitaltv/
converter_boxes.php 
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“Cash for Clunkers” program. Depending on the difference in fuel economy between the 
trade-in vehicle and the new vehicle, participants received a voucher for either $3,500 or 
$4,500.144 Nearly 700,000 clunkers were traded in between July 1, 2009 and August 24, 
2009 as part of the program for a total cost of $2.85 billion.145 In addition, federal tax 
credits of $300 or more continue today for installing energy efficient equipment in 
homes146 and many municipalities provide rebates for installing equipment that reduce 
water usage.  
Providing a $100 to $250 rebate incentive for an estimated 100,000 AIS units 
would cost the federal government between $10 and $25 million. This is a fraction of the 
costs expended on some of the above incentive programs, and it would produce 
immediate and tangible savings for the law enforcement agencies enforcing border 
security. Providing a $50 rebate would cost approximately $5 million and equate to the 








144 Ted Gayer, and Emily Parker, Cash for Clunkers: An Evaluation of the Car Allowance Rebate 




146 “Federal Tax Credits for Consumer Energy Efficiency,” Energy Star, accessed November 17, 
2014, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=tax_credits.tx_index  
147 Striegler, “Vancouver’s Xanatos Marine Makes AIS Sale.” 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) technology could significantly improve 
border security and reduce the small vessel threat to the United States. Requiring AIS for 
all vessels conducting international voyages to enhance maritime security and safety is 
aligned with DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy Implementation Plan Goals 2 and 3.148 
This action follows a layered, state-of-the-art approach that leverages technology to 
enhance the nation’s ability to detect, determine intent, and, when necessary, interdict 
suspicious small vessels. The AIS requirement conforms to the Small Vessel Security 
Strategy to reduce potential security and safety risks from small vessels
 
through the 
implementation of “security operations that strike the proper balance between 
fundamental freedoms, adequate security, and continued economic stability.”149 The 
advantages of requiring Class A or Class B AIS outweigh the disadvantages and would 
strengthen law enforcement agencies ability to detect and interdict small boats in the 
vicinity of the border that are conducting illegal activities or attempting to smuggle 
people and/or weapons into the U.S. across the maritime border. This regulation would 
align with the actions being taken by other countries around the world to require AIS on 
small private vessels as has been done in Singapore and Mexico.  
An AIS requirement aligns private vessels with private aircraft and improves 
safety for the mariner as well as security for the nation. With legitimate marine traffic 
broadcasting AIS, law enforcement agencies would be able to focus on small dark 
contacts that are not transmitting AIS and carrying potential terrorists, illegal drugs, 
money, weapons, and migrants across our borders. Satellites are the most efficient sensor 
systems for wide area surveillance and increasing maritime domain awareness. 
Furthermore, commercial entities are rapidly acquiring worldwide surveillance 
capabilities. As new SARSAT detection systems come online, AIS will be key to sorting 
148 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan, 1. 
149 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, 1. 
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the information collected by these satellites, provide detailed information to the 
intelligence community, and direct law enforcement to investigate suspicious vessels 
illegally transiting the maritime border.  
Coupling an AIS requirement with CBP’s SVRS aligns with the DHS’s 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 2014 strategy of expanding risk based security 
by removing low risk vessels from the haystack and allows existing resources to focus 
efforts against illicit maritime activities.150 The SVRS registration and float plan, 
combined with AIS, delivers enough information for border security agencies to 
determine if, when, and where to target and conduct a boarding of the vessel. AIS 
automates the existing SVRS and removes the inconsistencies of a self-reporting system 
for border crossings and security in the maritime arena. CBP estimates that only a small 
percentage of the vessels returning to the U. S. report arrival information as required by 
the law,151 and an AIS requirement would allow for improved performance measures of 
compliance. As vessels are detected in violation of the policy, corrective measures can be 
taken to increase participation and compliance shrinking the haystack even further.  
Implementation costs for both the government and public are low and the program 
has the potential to make maritime border security operations more efficient and 
effective. If the government attempted to detect, identify, interdict, and board each vessel 
crossing our maritime border as is done now with aircraft and vessels, it would expend 
between $5,000 and $10,000 per maritime boarding event. AIS allows law enforcement 
agencies to monitor the border without having to detect, identify, and interdict on the 
water. Agencies could decide the need, time, and location of conducting a boarding to 
ensure compliance with federal law providing a more streamlined border crossing for the 
mariner.  
 
150 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 35. 
151 Caldwell, Maritime Security DHS Could Benefit, 7. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS.  
The following are recommendations this thesis research, analysis and discussion 
will support: 
(1) Implement AIS Requirement 
DHS should implement a requirement for all vessels to install and broadcast Class 
A or Class B AIS when conducting international voyages. The regulation should expand 
the existing Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS) to a mandatory program where 
mariners are required to pre-register and file float plans prior to conducting an 
international voyage. When registering for the SVRS, owners must provide the MMSI 
number for the AIS equipment that is installed on the vessel. Essentially, this would be 
akin to issuing a passport to a vessel. 
(2) Engage Stakeholders 
The second recommendation is to engage the various stakeholders early in the 
process since “trying to solve the problems of implementation after the law, structure, 
and blueprint of an undertaking are already decided is too late.”152 Implementing 
government laws and regulations can be a complex process within democracies. The 
United Nations indicates the key attributes of good governance as transparency, 
responsibility, accountability, participation, and responsiveness.153 Successful execution 
of public policy begins at the idea phase, not during implementation.154 In this spirit, 
U.S. government rule making follows a specific process to be both transparent and allow 
for participation where the public is allowed to comment on potential new laws and 
regulations. The website for conducting the business of rulemaking can be found at the 
regulations.gov website. The success or failure of various proposed regulations is clearly 
impacted by stakeholders via public opinion. The regulations’ website states: “Public 
152 William D. Eggers, and John O’Leary, If We Can Put a Man on the Moon: Getting Big Things 
Done in Government (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2009), Kindle edition, location 415. 
153 “Good Governance and Human Rights,” United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, accessed November 11, 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/en/Issues/Development/
GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx  
154 Eggers, and O’Leary, If We Can Put a Man on the Moon, Location 415. 
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participation matters. Democratic, legal, and management principles justify why public 
comments make a difference in regulatory policy. Public participation is an essential 
function of good governance. Participation enhances the quality of law and its realization 
through regulations.”155  
(3) 2015 Small Vessel Security Summit 
To facilitate the drafting of appropriate AIS rules and regulations as well as an 
effective implementation strategy, DHS should bring together select members and groups 
who participated in the 2007 National Small Vessel Security Summit. This panel should 
review the changes in technology and threat and advise DHS on a specific AIS policy 
design that balances competing issues and concerns yet fulfills maritime security needs. 
If time and funding are available, the summit could be expanded to revisit all of the 
issues examined back in 2007 as well as open the floor for new topics. 
(4) Incentive Program  
The fourth and final recommendation is to have an incentive program. The federal 
government should consider offering a financial rebate to those that comply with the 
regulations as an incentive. After a reasonable grace period, mariners found not in 
compliance with the law should lose the opportunity to receive a rebate and possibly be 
fined for their failure to participate in the program.  
C. EPILOGUE 
Implementing an AIS requirement for all vessels conducting international 
voyages to and from the U.S. is a risk-based security action that can be achieved within 
current budget constraints. This action provides direct support to three of the five basic 
homeland security missions.156 
• Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security—Preventing terrorist attacks 
on the nation is and should remain the cornerstone of homeland security. 
By shrinking the haystack, AIS increases the probability of border security 
155 Regulations.Gov, “Home,” accessed November 17, 2014, http://www.regulations.gov/#!home  
156 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 6–7. 
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forces detecting and interdicting terrorists attempting to enter the country 
through our maritime borders, which makes the nation more secure.    
• Secure and Manage Our Borders—AIS uses enhanced technology to 
improve upon border security, to exclude terrorist threats, drug traffickers, 
and other threats to national security, economic security, and public safety. 
AIS is a risk-based strategy that is smart, cost-effective, and conducted in 
a manner that is acceptable to the American people. 
• Enforce and Administer Our Immigration Laws—AIS coupled with 
small vessel float plans will improve our nation’s ability to enforce our 
immigration laws and administer our immigration system. 
We know that not all small boats crossing our maritime borders are law-abiding citizens 
and implementing this AIS regulation allows us to “trust, but verify.” 
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